Hungary's Pronatalist Policies: A Mixed Legacy in Boosting Birth Rates
Hungary's ambitious pronatalist policies aimed at increasing birth rates have seen initial success, but recent trends reveal a decline, raising questions about their long-term effectiveness.
In the eastern Hungarian city of Debrecen, Barbara Elek anxiously checks her emails while waiting to learn the outcome of her third IVF attempt. She and her husband Levi are concerned about their financial stability if their latest attempt to conceive does not succeed. Barbara, 33, a social worker, and Levi, 34, a chef, had taken out a 10 million-forint (£25,000) loan under Hungary's pronatalist program, which offers financial incentives to couples willing to have children. If they do not prove they are expecting a child by 1 November, they may face repaying the loan with penalty interest, a situation they are not prepared to handle.
Hungary's previous government, led by Viktor Orbán, introduced extensive pronatalist policies in 2010 to combat declining fertility rates, which were below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The government offered various financial incentives, including interest-free loans, mortgage subsidies, and tax breaks, specifically targeting married heterosexual couples in the formal job market. At the time, Hungary's fertility rate was among the lowest in Europe, and Orbán's party, Fidesz, aimed to reverse this trend by encouraging Hungarian families to grow.
Initially, Hungary's fertility rate increased from 1.25 in 2010 to 1.59 by 2020, garnering attention as a potential success story, particularly among some U.S. conservatives. However, by 2025, the rate fell to 1.31, not significantly higher than when these incentives were first implemented. Tomas Sobotka from the Vienna Institute of Demography described this decline as a failure in terms of the policies' objectives.
The question arises: why did Hungary's pronatalist approach yield a temporary increase in births followed by a decline? Some experts argue that the policies may have mitigated a more severe decline in fertility amidst a broader trend across Europe, where fertility rates have been falling since the 1980s. Fruzsina Skrabski from the pro-family NGO Three Princes, Three Princesses, believes that without these initiatives, the number of births would have been significantly lower.
Maté and Agi Gorondy, a couple from the suburbs of Budapest with five children, credit Hungary's family-friendly environment for their decision to have a large family. They utilized maternity pay, baby loans, and subsidies to enhance their living situation. Maté noted a cultural shift in their neighborhood, where families with multiple children have become more common. In 2020, families with three or more children peaked at 146,000, but numbers have since declined to 125,000 by 2024.
Timothy P. Carney, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, highlighted the successful framing of family support as a central political narrative during Orbán's tenure, evident in the 'Family-Friendly Hungary' messaging at Budapest airport. However, not all demographics benefited equally from the financial incentives. János Tóth, a philosopher at the University of Szeged, pointed out that the program favored lower middle-class families in rural areas, while urban couples struggled to make the financial assistance stretch amid rising inflation.
Experts like Eva Fodor, co-director of the Democracy Institute at Central European University, have questioned the long-term impact of Hungary's policies. In her research, Fodor found that many well-educated women perceived government support as a one-time payment rather than a long-term solution for child-rearing. They expressed a need for better basic services, including healthcare and childcare, rather than just financial incentives.
The trend of declining fertility rates is not unique to Hungary; countries like South Korea, which invested heavily in family support without reversing declining birth rates, illustrate a broader issue. South Korea has spent over £215 billion since 2008 to incentivize childbirth, yet its fertility rate dropped to 0.8 by 2025. Experts believe that societal factors, such as economic instability and cultural attitudes towards family, play a significant role in reproductive decisions.
The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing trends, leading to a decline in fertility rates as uncertainty and instability grew. Sobotka noted that crises, such as the war in Ukraine and inflation, have further impacted couples' decisions to start families. In contrast, countries like Sweden have seen a rise in fertility rates due to policies promoting work-life balance and shared parental leave, although even they have faced declines in recent years.
As Hungary continues to grapple with its fertility challenges, the new government under Peter Magyar has stated it is reviewing the existing pronatalist policies. Barbara and Levi's situation highlights the precarious nature of these financial incentives. After receiving news that their latest IVF attempt was unsuccessful, the couple faces an uncertain future, caught in a system that promised support but has left them without the family they hoped for and in potential financial distress.
The Hungarian National Bank reports that about one in five couples who took out the loans five years ago have not had children. As the government examines the implications of these policies, the experiences of families like Barbara and Levi serve as a poignant reminder of the complexities surrounding pronatalist initiatives.
